Interesting things in the world of electronics served as easy to digest articles with a touch of wit.

What is Chips Diplomacy?

Semiconductor chips are essential to all modern electronic devices, making them indispensable for both economic security and national security. Given its capital-intensive nature and the highly specialised technologies, materials and tools needed, the global semiconductor ecosystem is complexly interdependent with different nations or regions dominating different segments of the value chain. The shortage of chips during the COVID-19 pandemic made many nations realise their vulnerability to supply chain disruptions due to natural disasters, geopolitical risks, and their weaponisation to gain strategic influence over other countries. For major powers, this chips dependency is an unacceptable vulnerability that threatens their strategic autonomy in geopolitics as well as economic well-being and competitiveness.

Chips diplomacy can be defined as the strategic use of semiconductor chips as a tool in international politics. It involves both using access to semiconductor technologies, production, equipment and materials, and supply chains as a diplomatic weapon to pursue strategic goals as well as building strategic partnerships with countries in the chips ecosystem to diversify and strengthen supply chains and to cooperate in advanced research to control the future of semiconductor technology.

The EU’s Chips Diplomacy

In the last decade, the European Union (EU) policymakers have been increasingly concerned with the need to maintain European technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy in geopolitics. The chips shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic made them focus particularly on the semiconductor sector as a matter of critical importance to European economic and technological competitiveness as well as geostrategic autonomy. Efforts have been made to reduce European dependence on China and Taiwan to protect against weaponisation of supply chains and future geopolitical risks. Apart from trying to achieve self-sufficiency across the chips value chain through the EU Chips Act, the EU has been deepening its partnership with like-minded countries to build resilient supply chains in the semiconductor industry.

Let us take a look at some of these initiatives:

1. Digital Partnerships: The EU has signed four digital partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Canada.
   • With Japan: Japan controls over half of the global semiconductor materials market and nearly one-third of the wafer fabrication equipment market. Therefore, the EU signed its first digital partnership with Japan in May 2022. Following this, Japan and EU have held four Digital Partneship Councils – the first in 2023, the second on 30 April 2024, the third on 12 May 2025, and the fourth on 5 May 2026. Along with cooperation in such areas as AI, online platforms, quantum technology, cybersecurity, etc, special attention has been given to collaboration in research on cutting-edge semiconductors and in addressing challenges caused by non-market policies and practices and supply chain dependencies. To systematically advance this relationship, a time-bound project was launched on 15 April 2026 named JASMINE (Japan and EU Semiconductor: Mutual Innovations and Excellence)~. It functions through four interconnected work packages and aims to produce after 18 months final reports and recommendations to secure EU-Japan value chains and for R&D collaboration to create mutually beneficial synergies based on their respective strengths.
   • With South Korea: It was launched in November 2022 when both sides agreed to cooperate on semiconductors, cybersecurity, quantum computing, AI, etc. The second Digital Partnership Council meeting was held on 26 March 2024 in Brussels and the third took place on 23 November 2025 in which both sides reinforced their commitment to collaboratively develop advanced chips to power AI and autonomous driving applications. South Korea leads the world in memory chips production and also holds a significant share of global semiconductor equipments and materials market.
   • With Singapore: It was signed on 1 February 2023 and committed both sides to work together on semiconductors along with trusted data flows and innovation, digital trust, digital skills for workers, and digital transformation in businesses and public services. Their second Digital Partnership Council meeting was held on 1 December 2025 and emphasised joint research in semiconductors and quantum technologies. Singapore’s capabilities cover the entire semiconductor value chain from design, manufacturing, assembly, testing, and packaging. It controls roughly 10% of the global chips manufacturing and nearly 20% of global semiconductor equipment market share.
   • With Canada: It was launched on 24 November 2023 when EU and Canada agreed to work together on AI, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, semiconductors, and foreign information manipulation and distortion. The first EU and Canada Digital Partnership Council meeting was held in Montreal on 8 December 2025 in which both sides agreed to cooperate in advancing innovation and economic resilience. In semiconductors, Canada is an important R&D and design hub and also has capabilities in advanced packaging.
2. EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC): It was launched by President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 15 June 2021 in Brussels. It is a forum to coordinate European and American approaches to matters of trade and emerging technologies and deepen cooperation in countering threats from ‘unfair competition’ and ‘the misuse of new technologies’. It is co-chaired by US Secretary of State, the US secretaries of commerce and trade, and equivalent European Commission executive vice-presidents. Ten working groups have been set up including one on secure supply chains especially of semiconductors. A number of meetings took place under Biden presidency, but progress has stalled since the coming of Trump administration in January 2025.
3. EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC): It was launched in February 2023 and is co-chaired by Indian external affairs minister, commerce minister, electronics and IT minister along with their counterparts in the European Commission. The TTC functions through three working groups that focus respectively on strategic technologies, green and clean technologies, and resilient value chains. One of the initiatives launched by the first working group focuses on policy coordination in semiconductor sector. Consequently, a memorandum of understanding on semiconductors was signed on 23 November 2023 to use the working group as a platform to strengthen cooperation on exchange of experiences and best practices; research and development; promotion of advanced skills and workforce development; and transparency of subsidies. The second meeting of the TTC was held in February 2025 while the third took place on 15 July 2026. In the third meeting, the two sides agreed to a joint India-EU round table during the Semicon India 2026. Both sides emphasised facilitating investments in the semiconductor sector and increasing cooperation in R&D including collaboration between Semiconductor Design Facilities under the India Semiconductor Mission and EU Pilot Lines under the EU Chips Act for access to advanced Process Design Kits (PDKs) and technology platforms and shuttle programmes to enable cost-effective silicon prototyping.
4. EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue (TID): Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relationsand EU’s adherence to ‘One China’ policy, the EU started an annual dialogue with Taiwan in 2022 to strengthen economic, technological and security ties between the two. Four such meetings have been held so far with semiconductors being a key area of focus along with renewable energy. Taiwan produces 90% of the global advanced chips (7 nm and below) and around 60% of all chips.
5. EU-ASEAN Strategic Relationship: In the semiconductor global value chain, the ASEAN countries excel in assembly, testing and packaging (ATP) with Malaysia alone accounting for almost 13% of the global ATP output. In 2025, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Framework for Integrated Semiconductor Supply Chain (AFISS) aimed at enhancing its role in the global chips value chains by transforming itself from a regional back-end service provider into a vertically integrated semiconductor production base. The EU has had annual ‘dialogues’ with the ASEAN since 1977 but these were upgraded to a strategic partnership in December 2020. Both sides hope to further advance the relations to a full Comprehensive Strategic Partnership by 2027. The EU looks to the region to diversify its supply chains and reduce dependence on China.

What is CHIPDIPLO?

CHIPDIPLO refers to the Chips Diplomacy Support Initiative, an EU-funded project that brings together selected European think tanks to facilitate and promote dialogues, research, and advocacy aimed at strengthening European resilience in the semiconductor sector. Given the critical role of chips for most industries and defence, diplomatic outreach in this sector has become a vital component of the EU’s overall economic foreign policy as well as geostrategic calculations.

The CHIPDIPLO project began in March 2025 and is expected to continue for 18 months. It is led by Institut Montaigne (Paris) and also includes other institutes such as the Central European Institute for Asian Studies (CEIAS, Bratislava), the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS, Brussels), and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS, Paris and Brussels). As part of the project, these think tanks are engaged in hosting dialogues between stakeholders in semiconductor industry, civil society, and policymakers; producing policy papers; spurring advocacy efforts; building monitoring and analytical tools to better identify and manage supply chain vulnerabilities and risks; tracking the implementation of the EU Chips Act; and providing regular updates to the European Commission. Simultaneously, this consortium aims to build and strengthen relations with similar networks in key non-EU countries.

Basically, the project works at two levels: internally within the EU, it seeks to enhance coordination among the twenty-seven EU member states in the semiconductor sector; and externally, it aims to enhance the EU’s ability to secure the chips supply-chains through a more effective diplomatic outreach to countries that are part of the global semiconductor ecosystem. In particular, it looks to off-set geopolitical risks and weaponisation of supply chains by expanding cooperation with important partners like the US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore as well as by building new networks with emerging players like India and the ASEAN.

As part of the CHIPDIPLO project, these think tanks have launched a number of initiatives:

1. EU Chips Ecosystem Tracker: Developed and maintained by CEIAS (Bratislava), it is a publicly available map that tracks European semiconductor facilities and projects across the entire value chain. It helps improve collective information sharing and coordination among the EU member states as well as showcases European innovations and industrial strengths to partner countries.
2. Policy Dialogues: It brings together key stakeholders from the semiconductor industry, investors, research and technology organisations and policymakers to discuss and identify best practices and actionable solutions to problems facing the European chips ecosystem. For instance, in November 2025, a simulation exercise was undertaken to rehearse European response to supply chain disruptions.
3. Public Conferences:At least three such conferences have been held so far to discuss Europe’s policy options on chips supply chains in an increasingly unstable global environment marked by US-China economic and technological rivalry and restrictions on access to critical materials, tools, and technologies.
4. Publications: A number of policy papers have been published assessing the effectiveness of current European initiatives in the semiconductor sector, analysing the policies of other countries, and suggesting newer policy measures and diplomatic initiatives.
5. Interviews of International Experts: Insitut Montaigne has been conducting a series of exclusive interviews with experts from the US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, etc to better understand and learn from how these countries are meeting geopolitical challenges facing their semiconductor industry.

Conclusion: EU’s shift towards ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’?

In 2023, the EU enacted its Chips Act to ensure resilience of chips supply chains by reducing external vulnerabilities and dependencies. It set an ambitious target of raising Europe’s share of global production of advanced chips to 20% by 2030 by building fabrication facilities and funding R&D. Pursuing self-sufficiency across the chips value chain was framed as necessary for European technological sovereignty and full strategic autonomy in geopolitics.

Of late, however, many experts, industry leaders and policymakers have begun to argue that ‘full autonomy is neither realistic nor desirable.’ Rather, the European strategy should be ‘Allied Autonomy, European Indispensability’ – that is, Europe must leverage and strengthen its core capabilities (design and equipment) while cementing these in complementary relationships with trusted international partners. In other words, Europe should remain open to global trade but protect itself from supply chain disruptions and shocks by managing strategic partnerships with key players in which European contributions are indispensable.

Whether the EU goes for ‘full strategic autonomy’ or ‘open strategic autonomy’, only time will tell. Even if full autonomy is the chosen goal, the global semiconductor ecosystem and the present European structural weaknesses are such that Europe would continue to rely on trusted partnerships and an effective chips diplomacy in the foreseeable future.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Ques: What is a trade and technology council (TTC)?

A Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is a high-level cooperation platform between countries or regions that coordinates policies on trade, technology, innovation, and supply chains. It helps partners address challenges such as semiconductor shortages, emerging technologies, digital regulations, and economic security while promoting collaboration in strategic industries.

Ques: What is meant by strategic autonomy?

Strategic autonomy refers to the ability of a country or region to make important economic, technological, and security decisions independently without excessive reliance on external nations. It focuses on building domestic capabilities in critical sectors such as semiconductors, energy, defense, and telecommunications to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience.

Ques: Why is EU trying to establish autonomy regarding semiconductors?

The European Union is seeking semiconductor autonomy to reduce its dependence on foreign chip suppliers and improve supply chain resilience. Global chip shortages, geopolitical tensions, and the concentration of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in a few regions highlighted Europe’s vulnerability. By strengthening its semiconductor ecosystem through initiatives such as the EU Chips Act, the EU aims to enhance economic security, support technological innovation, and ensure a stable supply of critical chips for its industries.

European Union Series